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Sarah Kane’s World of Depression: The Emergence and 
Experience of Mental Illness in 4.48 Psychosis 
_Abstract 
Fictional narratives of mental illnesses often focus on individual experiences of pain, 
anxiety and suffering. As such, narratives depict the experiences of illness in a holistic 
way, revealing the embodied, situated and intersubjective — in other words, emer-
gent — nature of psychiatric disorders. They are thus able to create a different kind of 
understanding of mental disorders than medicalizing strands of psychiatry that tend to 
reduce mental illnesses to biological dysfunctions of the brain and the nervous system 
and thus ignore how disorders straddle the brain, the body and the environment. 
In this article, I discuss how the experiential world of depression is constructed 
and conceived of in Sarah Kane’s play 4.48 Psychosis. Kane’s depiction of severe, 
psychotic depression is in line with phenomenological accounts of the illness, in 
which depression is understood as an emergent phenomenon that gives rise to altera-
tions in the embodied being-in-the-world of the subject. The text refers to common 
cognitive-affective experiences and folk-psychological understandings of the mind 
and employs different intertextual, narrative and poetic strategies to convey the phe-
nomenal world of depression to its readers. In addition, Kane emphasizes that to treat 
depression a deeper understanding of this ‘state of emergency’ is needed than what 
medicalizing psychiatry is able to provide. 
1_Introduction: “At 4.48 when depression visits” 
After 4.48 I shall not speak again 
I have reached the end of this dreary and repugnant tale of a sense interned in an 
alien carcass and lumpen by the malignant spirit of the moral majority 
I have been dead for a long time1 
British playwright Sarah Kane (1971–1999) described her last works of fiction as “texts 
for performance.”2 In them, she moved towards a form of expression in which the ma-
teriality of the text, language and (inter)textuality had more and more significance over 
events and plot. This development reaches its peak in her last play, 4.48 Psychosis,3 
which focuses on the experiences of a person who suffers from psychotic depression.4 
The narrating I constructed in the play cites feelings of overwhelming sadness, social 
and corporeal alienation and loss of affectivity that ultimately lead to a feeling of being 
dead, and these experiences drive the narrator towards suicide. The play can even be 
understood as a suicide note addressed to its audiences — or, as Kane’s agent Mel 
Kenyon put it, “I pretend that [4.48 Psychosis] isn’t a suicide note but it is. It is both a 
suicide note and something much greater than that.”5 Through her ambiguous text, 
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Kane produces a situation of outmost emergency — one that taps into the experiences 
of the play’s readers and spectators. 
The play is divided into fragments of monologues and dialogues, which can be un-
derstood as twenty four short scenes. Kane, however, breaks the conventions of a play-
text by offering no stage directions.6 The fragments are composed in a poetic narrative 
form7 that draws its signifying power from, for example, typographical experimenta-
tion, alliteration and rhyme, gaps and silences, and literary allusions and intertexts — 
or “literary kleptomania,”8 as the narrating voice suggests. The places, events and char-
acters of the play are left open to interpretation, and readers and spectators are invited 
to fill the gaps.9 As Alyson Campbell has noted, Kane’s play creates a demand for the 
audience “to set active meaning-making aside; to allow the a-signifying power of the 
work to take over.”10 The play thus evokes experiences of a shattering mind by engag-
ing the emotions and experiences of its audience, as well as their understanding of the 
human mind.11 
4.48 is often discussed in relation to Kane’s own experiences of severe depression, 
her eventual suicide a few months after finishing the play and the political ramifications 
of the text. Critics pay attention to the ways audience members are situated as witnesses 
of mental illness and failing mental healthcare. They discuss how the play challenges 
psychiatric knowledge by imitating medical discourses and by revealing problems in 
therapeutic relationships.12 Meanwhile, less attention has been paid to the literary de-
vices and narrative techniques through which the experiential world of mental break-
down is enacted and which highlight the emergent nature of mental disorders. 
My essay brings together the two concepts, emergency and emergence. Emergency, 
evoked by severe mental illness, can be seen as the dominating theme or mood of 
Kane’s playtext. Emergence, on the other hand, refers to a process whereby a complex 
system arises through interactions among smaller systems and yet is different from 
them. I use the concept especially to illuminate the play’s account of mental disorders 
as phenomena that are connected but not reducible to neurochemistry and physical 
structures of the brain. 
In what follows, I will look at Kane’s play from the perspective of a reader who 
engages with the heterogeneous, collage-like storyworld and the shattering mind it de-
picts.13 I will show how, in Kane’s play, the human mind and mental disorders are 
understood and presented as emergent phenomena that are enacted through an interplay 
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between the mind and its social and material environments. This view goes against 
medicalizing psychiatric accounts in which mental illnesses are often reduced to prob-
lems of the brain and the nervous system. Rather, as phenomenological studies of ill-
ness have emphasized, and Kane’s text illustrates, mental disorders should be perceived 
in the broader context of the human mind which is embodied and situated in the world. 
In other words, mental illness should be seen as an emergent phenomenon that straddles 
brain, body and world.14 
In Kane’s play, as well as in phenomenological accounts of psychopathology, the 
entire experiential world of the subject is seen as being altered by depression. In addi-
tion, both stress that to understand the emergent nature of mental disorders, one needs 
to explore the experiences of illness. I will begin by looking at the structure of the play 
and the ways the diagnosis of depression is constructed in it. Then, I move to Kane’s 
representation of psychiatric reductionism and discuss the therapeutic relationship de-
picted in the play. After this, I will show how Kane challenges the reductionist view by 
evoking the emergent, situated and intersubjective experiences of depression. Finally, 
I will take a closer look at the textual and narrative devices through which all of this is 
enacted, and I will consider the consequences the play has for understanding mental 
disorders. 
2_The Depressed Mind and the State of Emergency 
Readers of 4.48 are guided by a cyclical narrative structure that gradually discloses 
information about the situation of the play’s protagonist. The text is composed of a 
variety of different elements: First of all, there are fragments of dialogues, which seem 
to be either flashbacks of past patient-psychiatrist conversations or inner dialogues/hal-
lucinations of the narrator. Secondly, these dialogic segments are surrounded by frag-
ments of inner monologues and stream-of-consciousness, which seem to form the pre-
sent time of the story. At times, however, the division between the dialogues and mon-
ologues is blurred, and it becomes uncertain whether one can separate the narrating I 
of the monologues from the patient and therapist figures of the dialogues.15 In addition, 
as many interpreters have noted, Kane embeds citations from diagnostic manuals, self-
help books and literary texts within the first-person narration.16 
Despite the complexity of this work, it is very tempting to read the entire text as a 
product of one suffering mind. For example, Ken Urban has noted that multiplicity 
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“creates the uncanny sensation that the text is deeply monologic, the product of a sin-
gular, though divided, self.”17 Both its open form and strong evocation of affects and 
emotions make the text relatable and comprehensible, and many critics have pointed 
out that anyone who has experienced desire, love or pain is able to identify with the 
suffering of the play’s protagonist.18 
On the other hand, the destructive and pathological sides of these experiences also 
indicate that the text is a product of a mind that transgresses the borders of what is 
usually considered to be ‘normal.’ Kane herself said, while writing the play, that she 
tried to create a narrative form that would express the experience of a psychotic break-
down — the collapse of boundaries between self and other, and between self and the 
world: 
[The play is] about a psychotic breakdown and what happens to a person’s mind 
when the barriers which distinguish between reality and different forms of imag-
ination completely disappear, so that you no longer know the difference between 
your waking life and your dream life. And also you no longer know where you 
stop, and the world starts.19 
In a way, the emergency of the mental breakdown is simulated for the reader, as the 
uncertainty of the events depicted becomes clearer and clearer. The form imitates the 
experience in which, as Kane says, “you no longer know where you stop, and the world 
starts” or in which the distinction between the self and the other disappears.20 Kane 
uses literary devices like the blurring of speaking positions and narrative modes, shifts 
in the moods and tones of the text, as well as intertexts, allusions and references to 
medical discourses in order to reveal the instability of the boundaries between the self 
and the world. Psychotic depression is ultimately depicted both as a clinical condition 
and as a state that questions the relationship between self, body and their rootedness in 
the world. The text thus opens readers’ eyes to the human fact of emergent situatedness 
in the world — a fact that we tend to ignore when not faced with states of emergency 
such as mental breakdown. 
The worldly and intersubjective nature of depression is already indicated in the first 
scene. The play begins with a lopsided, almost haunting dialogue in which an unknown 
voice is questioning a silent other: 
(A very long silence.) 
But you have friends. 
(A long silence.) 
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You have a lot of friends. 
What do you offer your friends to make them so supportive? 
(A long silence.) 
What do you offer your friends to make them so supportive? 
(A long silence.) 
What do you offer? 
(Silence.)21 
This first scene frames the play with a painful experience of having failed in social 
relationships — or, more precisely, with a veiled (self-)accusation of not being able to 
offer anything to other people. The questioning voice could be understood as a hallu-
cination of the protagonist, but later on the dialogue is repeated and it is hinted that it 
is a fragment of an actual patient-therapist conversation, recollected by the narrating I. 
In the monologues that follow, the meaning of the play’s title is revealed: the I talks 
about a clarity that comes at night (“at 4.48”), hints ambiguously at suicide (“After 4.48 
I shall not speak again”)22 and evokes a painful, unbearable loss that has happened in 
the past: 
Sometimes I turn around and catch the smell of you and I cannot go on I cannot 
fucking go on without expressing this terrible so fucking awful physical aching 
fucking longing I have for you. And I cannot believe that I can feel this for you 
and you feel nothing. Do you feel nothing?23 
What is remarkable both in the ‘silent dialogue’ and in the monologues that depict 
longing and pain is that the protagonist’s experiences are tightly connected to other 
people and to intersubjective emotions like love, longing and shame. The protagonist 
is introduced to readers through the suffering that characterizes her/his relationships to 
other people and her/his being-in-the-world. S/he does not appear as someone who is 
‘ill’; s/he seems rather to be heart-broken, alienated from others, and grieving. 
On the other hand, different medical diagnoses are offered throughout the play. The 
protagonist suffers from “depression”, as stated in the monologues, and “pathological 
grief”, like one of the medical notes suggests.24 “Psychosis” is cited in the title of the 
play, and the narrating I uses common metaphors of a psychotic breakdown, for exam-
ple when s/he talks about her/his experiences of fragmentation: “And my mind is the 
subject of these / bewildered fragments;”25 “my body decompensates / my body flies 
apart.”26 In psychiatric terminology, the narrative describes a major depressive disorder 
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that closes in on psychosis.27 After the dialogical segments and fragmentary mono-
logues of the first scenes, the I offers an almost hyperbolic list of symptoms that seems 
to authenticate the depression diagnosis: 
I am sad 
I feel that the future is hopeless and things cannot improve 
I am bored and dissatisfied with everything 
I am a complete failure as a person 
I am guilty, I am being punished 
I would like to kill myself 
I used to be able to cry but now I am beyond tears 
I have lost interest in other people 
I can’t make decisions  
I can’t eat 
I can’t sleep 
I can’t think 
I cannot overcome my loneliness, my fear, my disgust 
I am fat 
I cannot write 
I cannot love 
[…] 
I cannot fuck 
I cannot be alone 
I cannot be with others 
My hips are too big 
I dislike my genitals 
 
At 4.48 
when depression visits 
I shall hang myself 
to the sound of my lover’s breathing 
 
I do not want to die 
 
I have become so depressed by the fact of my mortality that I have decided to 
commit suicide 
 
I do not want to live28 
The I names emotions and experiences which are commonly emphasized in diagnostic 
manuals: there is the depressed mood (“I am sad”), loss of pleasure (“I am dissatisfied”, 
“I cannot love”), and the experiences of guilt and shame (“I am a complete failure,” “I 
am guilty”) as well as the thoughts of death (“I have decided to commit suicide,” “I do 
not want to live”).  
When read or heard on stage, the detailed list creates an impression of deep subjec-
tive experiences. However, as readers and audiences with psychiatric knowledge might 
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notice, the list is actually an almost word-for-word quotation from a common diagnos-
tic tool, Beck’s Depression Inventory (BDI), used by clinicians in assessing the severity 
of depression. In BDI, the patient chooses experiences that are closest to her/his own 
from a multiple-choice list.29 The narrating I, in other words, borrows expressions from 
medical discourse to convey her/his experiences. Later on, a description of the domi-
nating experience is given in a repetitive fragment of stream-of-consciousness: “No 
hope No hope No hope No hope No hope No hope No hope.”30 Both in the ‘borrowed’ 
list of experiences and in the repetition that mimics the looping, depressed thoughts, 
the text evokes the most common experiences of deep, suicidal depression: sadness, 
loss of hope and loss of will to live — which all emphasize the emergency of the situ-
ation. 
Clinicians and phenomenologists of illness widely agree that depression is an affec-
tive and cognitive disorder that influences one’s moods and emotions as well as per-
ception and memory. It distorts both past and present experiences and diminishes the 
ability to verbalize them. The future seems hopeless and life unlivable, as negative 
experiences take control. The risk of suicide is high.31 What researchers and medical 
professionals disagree over, however, is the cause and treatment of the illness. The 
most common cure for depression in Western societies today is medical: antidepres-
sants should alleviate the loops of hopeless thoughts and additional therapy should help 
individuals find new thought paths and alter the self-image that is centered on experi-
ences of failure and hopelessness.32 Drugs and therapeutic talk are also what the psy-
chiatrist figure in Kane’s play offers — though unsuccessfully, as the silent dialogue 
seems to indicate. Through the patient-psychiatrist encounters — whether they are im-
agined, hallucinated or ‘actual’ —, Kane offers an insightful critique of reductionist 
psychiatry in its failure to pay attention to the emergent, intersubjective and embodied 
nature of depression. In the following, I will take a look at this critique, before turning 
more closely to the experiences of depression and their meaning. 
3_The Psychiatric Voice of Reason 
-I don’t despise you. It’s not your fault. You’re ill. 
-I don’t think so.33 
In Kane’s representation, the psychiatrist-figure sees the protagonist’s depression as an 
illness that has its origins in the functioning of her/his brain.34 Even though the borders 
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between the psychiatrist and the patient are ultimately blurred, Kane takes time to de-
pict how this reductionist view disregards the experiences of mental distress and re-
duces them to a mechanical, biochemical flaw. She uses three particular narrative strat-
egies to illustrate the problems of medicalizing psychiatry: (therapeutic) dialogues; the 
use of what I will call ‘drug-induced narration;’ and the use of medical notes as means 
of narration.  
With regard to the dialogues between the therapist and the patient figures, the ther-
apist’s main methods of treatment seem to be to either to offer drugs or to try to ‘reason’ 
with the patient in order to prove s/he is mistaken in her/his experiences and ways of 
thinking:  
-Have you made any plans? 
-Take an overdose, slash my wrists, then hang myself. 
-All those things together? 
-It couldn’t possibly be misconstrued as a cry for help. 
(silence) 
-It wouldn’t work. 
-Of course it would 
-It wouldn’t work. You’d start to feel sleepy from overdose and wouldn’t have the 
energy to cut your wrists.35 
The therapist’s strategy is to try to point out the flaws in the patient’s plan instead of 
finding out why the patient feels like s/he does. While the therapist’s pragmatic attitude 
to suicide can be considered humoristic, it also seems to lack empathy, as the discussion 
continues with a disagreement about the way the patient expresses her/his feelings: 
- […] I feel like I’m eighty years old. I’m tired of life and my mind wants to die. 
-That’s a metaphor, not reality. 
-It’s a simile. 
-That’s not reality. 
-It’s not a metaphor, it’s a simile, but even if it were, the defining feature of a 
metaphor is that it’s real.36 
The dialogues show that the therapist and the patient are engaging in completely dif-
ferent discourses: one is a discourse of rationality in which the world is ‘objective’ and 
in which the use of tropes, metaphors or similes seems to be a form of delusion; the 
other is the patient’s discourse in which s/he uses tropes to convey the complexity of 
her/his experiences. The dialogue quoted above also reveals that the patient is actually 
quite rational: s/he is able to discuss in abstract terms and make high-level cognitive 
distinctions. The problem is, rather, that s/he feels so tired that s/he cannot live (“I’m 
tired of life and my mind wants to die”). The experience is corporeal, and the expression 
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of feeling “eighty years old” offers a way to articulate this. Similarly, in a later scene, 
the therapist notices cuts in the patient’s arm, demanding to look at them and repri-
manding the patient for hurting her/himself. Again, the therapist fails to understand, as 
s/he is convinced that the patient has cut her/himself to “relieve tension.” This clinical 
opinion, however, has nothing to do with the patient’s experience — a fact that be-
comes clear in her/his reply: “Why don’t you ask me why? Why did I cut my arm?”37 
The main source of conflict, portrayed in these scenes, seems to be the therapist’s 
lack of understanding: the inability to view the patient’s experiences of distress as 
something that is not only caused by a malfunctioning brain or lack of reason but 
closely connected to her/his embodied being and relationships with others. The thera-
pist continues to explain that “You are ill,” and the patient keeps on refusing: “I am not 
ill. I am depressed. Depression is anger.”38 This conflict also reveals the gap between 
the actual experiences of the patient and pathologizing labels like “mentally ill” or “de-
pressed.” The patient is suffering, tired and wants to die. S/he understands that s/he is 
depressed and needs help, but at the same time psychiatric diagnosis and descriptions 
miss her/his experiences and their meanings. 
In addition to the dialogues, Kane uses drug treatment and medical notes to empha-
size the problems inherent in psychiatric care. The patient is afraid that drugs might 
affect her/his thinking and (literary) work, but ultimately agrees to try them. Soon after, 
the text loses its temporal structure, turning into fragments:39 
abstraction to the point of 
 
unpleasant 
unacceptable 
uninspiring 
impenetrable  
 
irrelevant 
irreverent 
irreligious 
unrepentant […]40 
The words follow each other by the logic of alliteration and negation (ab-, un-, un-, ir- , 
ir-, un-…), as if untethered from a conscious mind. The list is typographically arranged 
in sections, and the spaces in between create an impression of expressive difficulty, or 
of a great effort that is needed in forming thoughts: 
drowning in a sea of logic 
this monstrous state of palsy 
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still ill41 
In these ‘drug-induced’ segments of narration, the narrating I disappears altogether and, 
finally, psychiatric discourse takes total control in the form of medical notes: “Symp-
toms: Not eating, not sleeping, not speaking, no sex drive, in despair, wants to die.”42 
As the list of impersonal notes continues, the readers are faced with heterogeneity of 
different kinds of new symptoms, like weight loss and rashes:  
Setraline, 50 mg. Insomnia worsened, severe anxiety, anorexia, (weight loss 17 
kgs,) increase in suicidal thoughts, plans and intention. Discontinued following 
hospitalization. […]  
 
Zopiclone, 5.5mh. Slept. Discontinued following rash.43 
In addition to the original symptoms, numerous side effects arise from the testing of 
different drugs, ranging from physical changes to severe disorientation and suicidal 
plans. A voice, which imitates but at the same time breaks the discourse, emerges to 
comment on this:  
Lofepramine and Citalopram discontinued after patient got pissed off with side 
[e]ffects and lack of obvious improvement. […] 
 
Mood: Fucking angry  
Affect: Very angry.44 
For a few moments, expressions that appear to belong to the patient (“pissed off”, 
“fucking angry”) control the discourse, until the notes turn again into neutral, medical-
izing description: “Thorazine, 100mg. Slept. Calmer.”45 The notes and changes in reg-
ister thematize the way all experiences — whether they are caused by drugs or whether 
they are just normal emotional reactions to unpleasant situations — become viewed as 
pathological symptoms. The list finally ends with a passage that reveals the arbitrari-
ness of medical treatment — and covers a suicide attempt with a witty parody of drug 
talk: 
100 aspirin and one bottle of Bulgarian Cabernet Sauvignon, 1986. Patient woke 
up in a pool of vomit and said ‘Sleep with a dog and rise full of fleas.’ Severe 
stomach pain. No other reaction.46 
The clashes between the psychiatrist (and psychiatric discourse at large) and the patient 
advocate understanding the experiences of illness and viewing them in context. The 
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patient makes this explicit: “Don’t switch off my mind by attempting to straighten me 
out. Listen and understand […].”47 
Kane’s text reveals how, in the medicalizing, reductionist view, the human mind 
and human experiences become easily reduced to merely treatable, mechanical objects. 
Drugs not only treat symptoms but also change the patient’s sense of self. The problem, 
then, is that the embodied and situated experiences, interpersonal relationships and the 
subject’s embeddedness in the world — and thus the emergent nature of illness — are 
ignored. In addition, in some cases drug treatment makes the situation even worse by 
causing side-effects that are just as crippling as the disease — which is precisely what 
the patient fears at the beginning of the play, and what ultimately happens.48 As the 
therapeutic encounters, the drug cocktails and medical notes attest, sometimes treat-
ment fails, or even creates new problems. It seems that as long as the experiences of 
depression and their emergent nature are not understood, it is impossible to find a 
cure — medical or other. 
4_The Emergent World of Depression 
a consolidated consciousness resides in a darkened banqueting hall near the ceil-
ing of a mind whose floor shifts as ten thousand cockroaches when a shaft of light 
enters as all thoughts unite in an instant of accord body no longer expellant as the 
cockroaches comprise a truth which no one ever utters 
 
I had a night in which everything was revealed to me. 
How can I speak again?49 
Kane’s representation of the mind-in-a-world resonates with a current ‘enactivist’ un-
derstanding of the mind, according to which the human mind and its environment co-
emerge. Enactivism perceives the mind as a product of action in a specific environment: 
it is a process, something that is done, and the interaction between the mind and the 
environment shape both.50 In normal life, people quite automatically differentiate be-
tween the self and the world, but the enactivist account suggests that experience is ac-
tually structured by bodily dynamics and one’s interaction with the world. In fact, dif-
ferent marginal experiences such as psychosis (as well as dreams, out-of-body experi-
ences, etc.), which break the barriers between the mind and the world, reveal how ut-
terly intertwined the self, the world and others are. In addition, according to the enac-
tivist view, the sense of ‘self’, as well as the experience of ‘interiority’ of the mind, are 
dependent on the capability to be bodily attuned to the world and on one’s sense of 
embodied unity and coherence.51 
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Throughout the play, the patient-therapist dialogues and medical notes that mimic, 
exploit and modify psychiatric discourses are contrasted with another discourse, which 
could be characterized as a phenomenal discourse or ‘psychotic stream-of-conscious-
ness’. In these fragments, which form a part of the monologic strain of the text, the 
grammar is often broken, images take control and meanings become strained: “a con-
solidated consciousness resides in a darkened banqueting hall near the ceiling of a mind 
whose floor shifts as ten thousand cockroaches […].” In a way, Kane’s storyworld is 
trapped inside a depressed, psychotic mind. The material and social world around it 
disappears.52 But at the same time, the mind evoked in the text is very much connected 
to its surroundings and to other people — and this happens not only through the cultural 
and scientific discourses used in the text, but also in the passages that create the seem-
ingly solipsistic narrative of psychotic depression.  
Passages like the one quoted above portray the mind as dispersed within the material 
world via language that brings together concrete and metaphorical objects and spaces. 
The passages also challenge the very structures of language. The mind is the world — 
it is a ceiling, a floor of cockroaches that gives way to light, and these objects and 
spaces evoke a new meaning, “a truth which no one ever utters.” After this ‘psychotic’ 
flash of a mind conflated with the world, the text moves to the more structured interior 
monologue of the I (indented on the page), who now doubts her/his ability to express 
these experiences: “I had a night in which everything was revealed to me. / How can I 
speak again?” 
Kane alternates between different narrative modes and typographical settings to cre-
ate an impression of different perspectives; moving from stream-of-consciousness that 
conflates the mind to its surroundings to an internal monologue, which returns the 
speaking I to its place as the agent of the monologue. The fragments about cockroaches, 
ceilings and revelations are directly followed by a passage that retains the I but evokes 
an ominous feeling of unknown others surveilling her/him: 
and they were all there 
every last one of them 
and they knew my name 
as I scuttled like a beetle along the backs of their chairs53 
Again, the self is seen in an environment, now in a space inhabited by other people. 
“They” could be the doctors or the whole world which has “secret knowledge” about 
the I. The scene is delusional, as it breaks with our folk psychological understanding 
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of physical being, but it is metaphorically accurate when thinking about the protago-
nist’s experiences of psychiatric treatment. The segments resemble what phenomenol-
ogy of psychosis has called Stimmung: a strange mood or a moment before actual psy-
chosis in which the surrounding world takes on a new meaning.54 While the whole play 
is framed by the distressing dialogues between the psychiatrist and the patient, the idea 
of psychotic clarity of the world, which comes at night, is the motif of the monological 
segments. 
Phenomenological accounts of mental disorders emphasize the connections between 
the subject’s situatedness and embodied being-in-the-world, one the one hand, and the 
sense of coherence and reality which characterize ‘normal’ experience, on the other.55 
In mental illnesses, the structuring experiences of being-in-the-world have been altered, 
causing something similar to what Kane described as “no longer knowing where you 
stop, and the world starts.”56 The experiences that Kane’s protagonist cites throughout 
the play are very much in line with phenomenological descriptions. The protagonist’s 
being-in-the world is characterized by different kinds of experiential changes: altered 
bodily experiences, affective detunement, loss of the feeling of being alive, and height-
ening of negative emotions (especially of emotions that connect human beings to each 
other, like sadness, guilt, and shame).  
In what follows, I will take a closer look at these experiences and the ways the emer-
gent nature of mental illness is evoked. First of all, there are changes in the sense of 
embodiment — in the way the subject is corporeally situated in the world. Phenome-
nologist Thomas Fuchs has described severe depression as reification or corporealiza-
tion of the lived body. In depression “the body does not give access to the world, but 
stands in the way as an obstacle.”57 The body is supposed to function as a mediator to 
the world, but in depression it starts to feel like an alien object. According to Fuchs, 
“all this literally means a corporealization, in the sense of resembling a corpse, a dead 
body.”58 Or, as Kane’s monologist puts it: “I have been dead for a long time.”59 
In psychosis, on the other hand, the mind becomes disembodied — a mind without a 
body.60 Either there is an immaterial mind, as the speaking I describes:  
I will drown in dysphoria 
in the cold black pond of my self  
the pit of my immaterial mind61 
Or the body is there, but separated from the self:  
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Here I am  
and there is my body 
 
dancing on glass62 
Near the end of the play, as the psychotic experiences seem to grow stronger, Kane 
emphasizes the painful experiences of being distanced or separated from one’s body 
that characterize psychosis. But dualist experiences can also be found in the mono-
logist’s earlier complaints about being “fattened up” as well as in reference to the act 
of cutting oneself: both depressive corporealization and psychotic disembodiment rely 
on a heightened division between the body and the mind. 
In addition to the embodied nature of the experience of depression, Kane renders 
mental distress as deeply entangled with intersubjective relationships. The monologist 
is connected to other people, especially to the therapist figure, and looks at her/himself 
through the eyes of others. Already in the first dialogue the patient is tied to other peo-
ple in a very concrete way, as we saw earlier. Towards the end, just before the final 
monologue and the suicide scene, the text loops back to the silent dialogue of begin-
ning, framing the narrative and tying the various elements together. One way to inter-
pret the repetition would be to understand the scene as a traumatic memory that haunts 
the narrating I.63 It emphasizes the protagonist’s social relationships, supporting the 
interpretation which is hinted at throughout the text: the protagonist’s suffering is 
caused by being abandoned by the therapist. (“I trusted you, I loved you and it’s not 
losing you that hurts me, but your bare-faced fucking falsehoods that masquerade as 
medical notes.”)64 Near the end, the silent dialogue is repeated and continued, and the 
reader learns how the therapist ultimately refuses the patient’s friendship: “I fucking 
hate this job and I need my friends to be sane.”65 
The patient/therapist dialogues form a persuasive narrative about the problems of 
therapy and the subject’s entanglement with others. They highlight the tragedy of feel-
ing abandoned and disconnected from others. However, the monologues between these 
dialogical scenes also complicate such issues and prevent the reader from drawing sim-
ple conclusions. As previously mentioned, it is uncertain whether the dialogic segments 
are actual dialogues or distorted memories (or even figments of imagination or hallu-
cinations of the monologist). Even though it is repeatedly suggested that the mono-
logist’s pain is connected to therapy and to the loss s/he experiences, it is also uncertain 
who or what it is that s/he has actually lost: “[…] fuck my father for fucking up my life 
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for good and fuck my mother for not leaving him, but most of all, fuck you God for 
making me love a person who does not exist, FUCK YOU FUCK YOU FUCK 
YOU.”66 Such statements call forth the well-known psychoanalytical description of 
melancholy as mourning of an unidentified, loved object. The lost object is incorpo-
rated into the self, where it becomes a source of eternal sorrow, and the therapist in the 
play seems to have taken the place of this lost loved one.67 
The monologist’s experiences of shame and guilt can be understood as arising from 
painful self-other relationships. In phenomenological and psychoanalytical descrip-
tions, shame has been viewed as an experience in which the self is positioned against 
itself. It fails to fulfill the demands of a loved, ideal other. Guilt, on the other hand, is 
understood as resulting from the transgression of social norms that are incorporated in 
the self.68 For example, the dialogue about friendship can be read as a haunting self-
accusation, and the therapist figure brings up the shame and guilt that is afflicting the 
self. Later on, the self-reproaches grow stronger, taking on delusional forms: 
-I gassed the Jews, I killed the Kurds, I bombed the Arabs, I fucked small children 
while they begged for mercy, the killing fields are mine, everyone left the party 
because of me, I’ll suck your fucking eyes out send them to you mother in a box 
and when I die I’m going to be reincarnated as your child only fifty times worse 
and as mad as all fuck I’m going to make your life a living fucking hell I REFUSE 
I REFUSE I REFUSE LOOK AWAY FROM ME 
 
-It’s all right 
 
-LOOK AWAY FROM ME 
 
-It’s all right. I’m here. 
 
-Look away from me69 
The experiences of guilt range from feeling responsible for mass destruction to people 
leaving a party because of the protagonist. The self-accusations then turn into violent 
threats. 
The repeated command to “look away” crystallizes the painful divisions inside the 
speaking I, and the conflation of the identities of patient and therapist is finally con-
firmed, as the monological and dialogic strains of the text intermingle. What started as 
a monologue turns into a dialogue: 
-At 4.48 
when sanity visits 
for one hour and twelve minutes I am in my right mind. 
[…] 
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Why do you believe me then and not now? 
[…] 
 
-It’s all right. You will get better. 
 
-Your disbelief cures nothing. 
 
Look away from me70 
Kane’s text shows how depression facilitates random feelings of guilt and how grief 
over a loss can turn into an unspecific sad and depressed mood.71 Rather than solely 
illnesses of the brain, mental disorders are deeply entangled with intersubjective rela-
tionships, bringing together the brain, the embodied mind and their environment. 
As phenomenologist Matthew Ratcliffe puts it, in depression “the overall structure 
of one’s relationship with the world has altered.”72 This change in one’s being also 
explains the central paradox (and tragedy) of depression: wanting and not-wanting to 
die, or as Kane’s monologist puts it: “I do not want to die / […] / I do not want to live;” 
“This is not a world in which I wish to live.”73 In this context, suicide appears to be 
almost a rational thing to do — and this seems to be the conclusion that the monologist 
makes at 4.48 in the morning. However, Kane also warns against drawing conclusions 
in which suicide would be seen as a solution. The complexity of depressive experiences 
is articulated once more in the final scene, just before the suicide: “I have no desire for 
death. No suicide ever had.”74 Even though employing the ideas of death as transgress-
ing one’s body, dying for love or transcending “to the light,” Kane also continues to 
caution against romanticizing interpretations — just as she warns against interpreta-
tions which disregard the emergent nature of depression. The experiences of being al-
ienated from others, from one’s body and losing others as well as oneself are paradox-
ical, tragic and painful ‘states of emergency’, and Kane’s text shows how these expe-
riences start making sense when they are understood as an altered way of being-in-the-
world. 
5_Conclusion: “Listen and understand” 
Don’t switch off my mind by attempting to straighten me out. Listen and under-
stand.75 
 
Despair propels me to suicide 
Anguish for which doctors can find no cure 
Nor care to understand 
I hope you never understand 
Because I like you76 
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Phenomenologists have emphasized that even though it is impossible to ‘feel’ the ex-
periences of others, people are able to understand each other through their shared 
world: “To understand other persons I do not primarily have to get into their minds; 
rather, I have to pay attention to the world I already share with them.”77 The ability to 
understand and empathize with others is based on a shared sense of the world. Even 
though the experiences of severe, psychotic depression are strange and often discon-
certing, they also emphasize one’s sense of being an embodied subject in contact with 
other subjects in the world. It is possible to be moved by such experiences even when 
one does not go through them themselves, since all humans know what it is like to be 
connected to others, to feel their bodies and emotions such as love, guilt and shame that 
connect us to the world and contest the clearness of the borders of subjectivity. Recent 
cognitive literary studies have also suggested that fictional narratives are able to take 
us even ‘deeper inside’ others’ minds than would be possible in reality, as readers are 
invited to imaginatively engage with perspectives and experiences that can differ radi-
cally from their own.78 
For this last section, I will shortly outline the specific narrative and poetic techniques 
through which the experientiality of the text and the emergent nature of minds is 
evoked. First of all, Kane uses different narrative modes that modulate the distance 
between the voices of the play and the speaking/narrating and experiencing selves. This 
oscillation between distance and proximity is also tied to the use of (medical) intertexts. 
In a way, the monologist relies on experiences that other texts — like diagnostic man-
uals or self-help books — are able to evoke, for example when s/he lists what gives 
meaning to life: “to be forgiven, to be loved, to be free.”79 The words carry both the 
intimacy of the monologist’s final plea for life, and the irony of their borrowed nature.  
Secondly, experiences are conveyed through the materiality of language and the 
emotional valence that words carry. As the monologist puts it: “Just a word on a page 
and there is the drama.”80 Embodied metaphors evoke corporeal experiences, like the 
coldness of snow or hardness of glass in the speaking I’s final, fragmented sentences: 
“All I know / is snow / and black despair;”81 “Here I am / and there is my body / dancing 
on glass.”82 Kane also uses folk psychological ideas and experiences of the duality be-
tween the mind and the body that convey the experiences of corporealization and dis-
embodiment, as discussed earlier. The use of rhythm and repetition evokes the loops of 
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compulsive thought patterns of depression: “Shame. Shame. Shame. / Drown in your 
fucking shame.”83 
Similarly, the use of silences and gaps create changes in mood throughout the text, 
ranging from anger to resignation. In the final scene, the gaps grow wider and are more 
and more tied to the disappearance of subjectivity and approaching death: 
watch me vanish  
watch me 
 
vanish 
 
watch me 
 
watch me 
 
 
watch84 
The words fall like “black snow,” as mentioned at the top of the same page.85 The 
imperatives of this final scene can also be thought of in the context of a performance: 
in a way, readers encounter a person who is vanishing.86 On the final page, the separa-
tion between the speaking voice and the ‘real’ I is once more confirmed: 
It is myself I have never met, whose face is pasted on the underside of my mind  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
please open the curtains87 
A final literary allusion is made: the last line not only refers to the context of theater 
(yet in which the curtains are not closed but opened in the end) but also to Goethe’s 
Werther, who romantically ponders suicide as the “lifting of the curtain.”88 When read 
literally, the opening of the curtains seems to refer to the new morning that comes after 
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4.48, and for example the first performance of 4.48 at the Royal Court Theatre ended 
in an opening of the theatre’s shutters: the lights and noises of London were let in.89 
The last page offers a prime example of the way in which readers are invited to fill 
gaps, silences and ambiguities with embodied experiences as well as with everyday, 
literary and cultural knowledge. This was indeed Kane’s aim in her late works, in which 
she started to abandon stage directions and employ an open, poetic narrative form.90 A 
narrative form that comes close to poetry is very suitable for evoking the emergent 
nature of the mind and mental disorders, as well as their complexity. It is as if the 
emergency of the situation could not be conveyed with a traditional, coherent narra-
tive — just like it cannot be reduced to medicalizing psychiatric accounts, and thus 
other ways of telling are needed.  
Reading 4.48 Psychosis in relation to phenomenological accounts of depression re-
veals several important consequences that the play has for the ways human minds and 
mental illness can be perceived. First of all, Kane’s text challenges Western under-
standings of depression and psychosis. Rather than treating them as cognitive disorders 
in which the rationality of thought is lost and ‘irrational’ experiences take control, they 
are viewed as alterations in the subject’s being-in-the-world: in cognitive-affective ex-
periences, in the subject’s situatedness and attunement in the world and in self-other 
relations. The play emphasizes the emergent nature of illness as well as the structures 
of the subject’s being-in-the-world. 
Secondly, the play portrays the human mind in a way that challenges dualistic views 
of subjectivity and mind. It questions — at the same time as it employs — the divisions 
between mind and body, subject and world, internal and external, subjective and ob-
jective, rational and irrational. This also happens on the level of fictional conventions 
that make the breaking of dualisms possible: literary techniques, evocation of experi-
entiality and the themes presented are all connected to each other. The play reveals how 
not simply “ill minds”, but all human consciousness is tied to embodiedness and situ-
atedness in a specific environment. Subjectivity, the mind and consciousness emerge 
in an interplay between the self, body and world. 
Thirdly, the play makes questionable pathologizing attitudes toward people who 
suffer from mental illness. Kane’s text shows the problems of labeling and attempting 
to understand mental illness through reductionist diagnostics, without, however, down-
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playing the emergency of the situations. Although critical of reductionist and medical-
izing psychiatry, Kane’s play does not romanticize mental illness or understate the se-
verity of clinical depression. Rather, it portrays the emergency of individual pain and 
suffering. Instead of pathologizing and enclosing the experiences into narrow diagnos-
tic categories, the play invites us to resonate with the protagonist and to reflect upon 
her/his experiences. 
1  Sarah Kane, 4.48 Psychosis, in Complete Plays (London: Methuen, 2001), 203–245, here: 213–
214. 
2  Kane specifically refers to Crave and to 4.48 Psychosis, cf. Kane in an interview with Dan Rebel-
lato, qtd. in Graham Saunders, About Kane: The Playwright and the Work (London: Faber, 2009), 
95. On the opposition between a text and a performance in Kane’s work and on the context of 
postdramatic theatre, cf. e. g. Matthew Roberts, “Vanishing Acts: Sarah Kane’s Texts for 
Performance and Postdramatic Theatre,” in Modern Drama 1 (2015), 94–110. 
3  Kane wrote 4.48 Psychosis in late 1998 and early 1999, and it was first performed at the Royal 
Court Jerwood Theatre Upstairs, London on June 23th 2000. The first production was directed by 
James Macdonald. Cf., David Greig, “Introduction,” in Complete Plays, by Sarah Kane (London: 
Methuen, 2001), ix–xviii, here: xvii. 
4  Kane employs two clinical labels throughout the play: psychosis (in the title of the play) and de-
pression (in the text). ‘Psychosis’ commonly refers to a condition in which contact with reality is 
lost. It usually involves phenomena like delusions and hallucinations, and it can be caused, for 
example, by schizophrenia, or severe depression, as seems to be the case in Kane’s play. One could 
say that whereas ‘depression’ is the overarching diagnostic category that Kane uses, ‘psychosis’ is 
one of the symptoms and ultimate consequences of the protagonist’s depression.  
5  Mel Kenyon, qtd. in Ken Urban, “An Ethics of Catastrophe: The Theatre of Sarah Kane,” in Per-
forming Arts Journal 3 (2001), 36–46, here: 44. 
6  By using the term ‘playtext’, I emphasize the textual form of the play: the text which is read. Mat-
thew Roberts and Alicia Tycer also use the term in their readings of 4.48, cf. Roberts, “Vanishing 
Acts” (cf. note 2); Alicia Tycer, “‘Victim. Perpetrator. Bystander’: Melancholic Witnessing of Sa-
rah Kane’s 4.48 Psychosis,” in Theatre Journal 1 (2008), 23–36. Another commonly used term is 
‘performance text’, e. g. Urban, “An Ethics” (cf. note 5).  
7  I understand Kane’s playtext as a narrative text despite its fragmentation and the complexity of its 
structure. I follow David Herman’s characterization of four necessary aspects of (prototypical) nar-
rativity: situatedness, event sequencing, world-making/world-disruption, and experientiality, 
cf. David Herman, Basic Elements of Narrative (Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell, 2009). 4.48 Psychosis 
relies on all the four elements, and especially world-disruption and experientiality are prominent 
features in it. 
8  Kane, 4.48 (cf. note 1), 207. 
9  Cf. also Greig, “Introduction” (cf. note 3); Roberts, “Vanishing Acts” (cf. note 2), 97. 
10  Alyson Campbell, “Experiencing Kane: An Affective Analysis of Sarah Kane’s ‘Experiential’ The-
atre in Performance,” in Australasian Drama Studies 1 (2005), 80–97, here: 80. 
11  On the evocation of experientiality in literature, cf. Marco Caracciolo, The Experientiality of Nar-
rative: An Enactivist Approach (Berlin/New York: de Gruyter, 2014).  
                                                 
On_Culture: The Open Journal for the Study of Culture 
Issue 1 (2016): Emergence/Emergency 
www.on-culture.org 
http://geb.uni-giessen.de/geb/volltexte/2016/12057/ 
22 
                                                                                                                                           
12  Cf. Tycer, “Victim” (cf. note 6); Urban, “An Ethics” (cf. note 5); and Ariel Watson, “Cries of Fire: 
Psychotherapy in Contemporary British and Irish Drama,” in Modern Drama 2 (2008), 188–210. 
13  My focus is on the playtext and its narrative and poetic techniques, but I will also mention some 
possible consequences for the performance of the text. Different performances of 4.48 Psychosis 
and their techniques have been discussed for example by Campbell, “Experiencing Kane” (cf. note 
10); Tycer, “Victim” (cf. note 6); Urban, “An Ethics” (cf. note 5), and Watson, “Cries of Fire” 
(cf. note 12). 
14  On this phenomenological-enactivist view of mental disorders, cf. e. g. Giovanna Colombetti, “Psy-
chopathology and the Enactive Mind,” in The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy and Psychiatry, eds. 
K. W. M. Fulford et al. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), 1083–1102; Thomas Fuchs, “Em-
bodied Cognitive Neuropsychiatry and Its Consequences for Psychiatry,” in Poiesis & Praxis 6 
(2009), 219–233; Michelle Maiese, Embodied Selves and Divided Minds (Oxford: Oxford Univer-
sity Press, 2015). 
15  Towards the end of the play, Kane begins segments of stream-of-consciousness with a quotation 
dash, thus blurring the divisions between the patient-psychiatrist dialogues and the inner mono-
logues, e. g. Kane, 4.48 (cf. note 1), 229. 
16  Cf. Antje Diedrich, “‘Last in a Long Line of Literary Kleptomaniacs’: Intertextuality in Sarah 
Kane’s 4.48 Psychosis”, in Modern Drama 3 (2013), 374–398, here: 383. Diedrich has written in 
detail about the different intertexts used in the play: 4.48 Psychosis borrows materials from and 
creates explicit allusions to, for example, Antonin Artaud’s texts, C. S. Lewis’s Narnia-series, Goe-
the’s Sorrows of Young Werther and a range of different psychiatric diagnostic tools, theories and 
self-help books. Throughout the play, the monologue turns into seemingly abstract lists of words 
and numbers, as if dissolving the speaking subject altogether, but even though these lists seem 
chaotic, they often have intertextual meanings. For example the numbers used in the text refer to a 
cognitive test in which a patient is asked to count down from one hundred in sevens. 
17  Urban, “An Ethics” (cf. note 5), 44; cf. Watson, “Cries of Fire” (cf. note 12), 192. 
18  Cf. Greig, “Introduction” (cf. note 3), xvii; Tycer, “Victim” (cf. note 6), 26. 
19  Cf. Kane in an interview with Dan Rebellato, qtd. in Saunders, About Kane (cf. note 2), 81. 
20  For a reader this is even more urgent whereas for a theatre audience some interpretative choices 
have always been made by those who have visualized the text. In the first performance of the play, 
the voice of the play was, for example, divided into three figures, following the text’s suggestion: 
“Victim. Perpetrator. Bystander”, Kane, 4.48 (cf. note 1), 231. Cf. e. g. Greig, “Introduction” 
(cf. note 3); Tycer, “Victim” (cf. note 6). 
21  Kane, 4.48 (cf. note 1), 205. 
22  Kane, 4.48 (cf. note 1), 213. 
23  Kane, 4.48 (cf. note 1), 214. 
24  Kane, 4.48 (cf. note 1), 207; 212; 223. 
25  Kane, 4.48 (cf. note 1), 210. 
26  Kane, 4.48 (cf. note 1), 238. 
27  Cf. DSM-5: Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, Fifth edition (Washington 
D.C.: American Psychiatric Association, 2013), 160–168.  
28  Kane, 4.48 (cf. note 1), 206–207. 
29  Cf. Diedrich, “Last in” (cf. note 16), 382–383. The BDI (Beck’s Depression Inventory) is a 21-
question multiple-choice self-report inventory which was first developed by psychiatrist Aaron T. 
On_Culture: The Open Journal for the Study of Culture 
Issue 1 (2016): Emergence/Emergency 
www.on-culture.org 
http://geb.uni-giessen.de/geb/volltexte/2016/12057/ 
23 
                                                                                                                                           
Beck in the 1960’s. In BDI the severity of depression is measured by calculating the patient’s 
choices between propositions like: “(0) I do not feel sad. (1) I feel sad. (2) I am sad all the time and 
I can’t snap out of it. (3) I am so sad or unhappy that I can’t stand it. (0) I am not particularly 
discouraged about the future. (1) I feel discouraged about the future. (2) I feel I have nothing to 
look forward to. (3) I feel the future is hopeless and that things cannot improve.” When compared 
to the inventory, Kane’s monologist’s score is approximately 60 — indicating extreme depression 
(the highest possible total is 62). 
Kane’s symptom listing is also very much in line with the latest DSM’s description of major 
depressive disorder, according to which five (or more) of the following symptoms have to be pre-
sent during a 2-week period: “1. Depressed mood most of the day, nearly every day, as indicated 
by either subjective report (e. g., feels sad, empty, hopeless) or observation made by others (e. g., 
appears tearful). […] 2. Markedly diminished interest or pleasure in all, or almost all, activities 
most of the day, nearly every day […]. 3. Significant weight loss when not dieting or weight gain 
[…], or decrease or increase in appetite nearly every day. […] 4. Insomnia or hypersomnia nearly 
every day. 5. Psychomotor agitation or retardation nearly every day […]. 6. Fatigue or loss of energy 
nearly every day. 7. Feelings of worthlessness or excessive or inappropriate guilt (which may be 
delusional) nearly every day […]. 8. Diminished ability to think or concentrate, or indecisiveness, 
nearly every day […]. 9. Recurrent thoughts of death […], recurrent suicidal ideation without a 
specific plan, or a suicide attempt or a specific plan for committing suicide.” DSM-5 (cf. note 27), 
160–161. 
30  Kane, 4.48 (cf. note 1), 218. 
31  Cf. DSM-5 (cf. note 27), 160–168; Thomas Fuchs, “Depression, Intercorporeality, and Interaffec-
tivity,” in Journal of Consciousness Studies 7–8 (2013), 219–238, here: 233. 
32  On medicalizing and reductionist psychiatry, cf. e. g. Pat Bracken and Philip Thomas, “Challenges 
to the Modernist Identity of Psychiatry: User Empowerment and Recovery,” in The Oxford Hand-
book of Philosophy and Psychiatry, eds. K. W. M. Fulford et al. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2013), 123–138; Louis C. Charland, “Why Psychiatry Should Fear Medicalization,” in The Oxford 
Handbook of Philosophy and Psychiatry, eds. K. W. M. Fulford et al. (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2013), 159–175. 
33  Kane, 4.48 (cf. note 1), 212. 
34  The psychiatrist, for example, suggests that the patient is “allowing” the illness, because s/he refuses 
to take medication in fear of losing the ability to work, 4.48, 220–221. 
35  Kane, 4.48 (cf. note 1), 210–211. 
36  Kane, 4.48 (cf. note 1), 211. 
37  Kane, 4.48 (cf. note 1), 217. 
38  Kane, 4.48 (cf. note 1), 212. 
39  Elsewhere in the play, the monologic segments can be understood as the present time of the play, 
but here the monologue seems to encompass both the past and the present events. 
40  Kane, 4.48 (cf. note 1), 221–223. 
41  Kane, 4.48 (cf. note 1), 221–223. 
42  Kane, 4.48 (cf. note 1), 223. 
43  Kane, 4.48 (cf. note 1), 223. Setraline is an antidepressant and Zopiclone is used to treat insomnia. 
44  Kane, 4.48 (cf. note 1), 224. Lofepramine and Citalopram are commonly used antidepressants. 
45  Kane, 4.48 (cf. note 1), 224. Thorazine is an anti-psychotic drug used to treat psychotic disorders 
like schizophrenia. 
On_Culture: The Open Journal for the Study of Culture 
Issue 1 (2016): Emergence/Emergency 
www.on-culture.org 
http://geb.uni-giessen.de/geb/volltexte/2016/12057/ 
24 
                                                                                                                                           
46  Kane, 4.48 (cf. note 1), 225. 
47  Kane, 4.48 (cf. note 1), 220. 
48  Another paradox is that it is exactly the drugs with which the monologist ends her/his life in the 
final scene. The monologist addresses the audience and lists the drugs s/he has taken: “Please don’t 
cut me up to find out how I died / I’ll tell you how I died / One hundred Lofepramine, forty five 
Zopiclone, twenty five Temazepam, and twenty Melleril.” Kane, 4.48 (cf. note 1), 241. The mono-
logist’s demand of not performing an autopsy can also be read as a final effort to fight against the 
view in which the human mind is reduced to a mechanism. 
49  Kane, 4.48 (cf. note 1), 205. 
50  Colombetti, “Psychopathology” (cf. note 14), 1094–1095; Maiese, Embodied Selves (cf. note 14), 
ix. Cf. also David Herman, “Re-minding Modernism,” in Emergence of Mind: Representations of 
Consciousness in Narrative Discourse in English, edit. David Herman (Lincoln: Nebraska Univer-
sity Press, 2011), 245–272. 
51  Cf. Maiese, Embodied Selves (cf. note 14), ix. 
52  On the narrowing of Kane’s focus in her last plays, cf. e. g. Greig, “Introduction” (cf. note 3), xvi. 
53  Kane, 4.48 (cf. note 1), 206. 
54  Cf. Louis A. Sass, Madness and Modernism: Insanity in the Light of Modern Art, Literature, and 
Thought (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press 1994), 45. 
55  Cf. Matthew Ratcliffe, “Existential Feeling and Psychopathology,” in Philosophy, Psychiatry & 
Psychology 2 (2009), 179–194, here: 181. 
56  Cf. Kane qtd. in Saunders, About Kane (cf. note 2), 81. 
57  Thomas Fuchs, “Corporealized and Disembodied Minds: A Phenomenological View of the Body 
in Melancholia and Schizophrenia,” in Philosophy, Psychiatry & Psychology 2 (2005), 96–107, 
here: 99. 
58  Fuchs, “Corporealized” (cf. note 57), 99. 
59  Kane, 4.48 (cf. note 1), 214. 
60  Fuchs, “Corporealized” (cf. note 57), 104. 
61  Kane, 4.48 (cf. note 1), 213. 
62  Kane, 4.48(cf. note 1), 230. 
63  For example Tycer makes this kind of an interpretation, cf. Tycer, “Victim” (cf. note 6), 27–28. 
64  Kane, 4.48 (cf. note 1), 210. 
65  Kane, 4.48 (cf. note 1), 237. 
66  Kane, 4.48 (cf. note 1), 215. 
67  Cf. Sigmund Freud, “Mourning and Melancholia,” in On Metapsychology: The Theory of Psycho-
analysis, trans. James Strachey (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1985), 245–268. 
68  Cf. e. g. Sara Ahmed, The Cultural Politics of Emotion (London: Routledge, 2004), 103–105. 
69  Kane, 4.48 (cf. note 1), 227. 
70  Kane, 4.48 (cf. note 1), 229–230. 
71  Cf. Thomas Fuchs, “The Phenomenology of Affectivity,” in The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy 
and Psychiatry, eds. K. W. M. Fulford et al. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), 612–631, 
here: 619. 
On_Culture: The Open Journal for the Study of Culture 
Issue 1 (2016): Emergence/Emergency 
www.on-culture.org 
http://geb.uni-giessen.de/geb/volltexte/2016/12057/ 
25 
                                                                                                                                           
72  Matthew Ratcliffe, “Depression and the Phenomenology of Free Will,” in The Oxford Handbook 
of Philosophy and Psychiatry, eds. K. W. M. Fulford et al. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), 
574–591, here: 579. 
73  Kane, 4.48 (cf. note 1), 207; 210. 
74  Kane, 4.48 (cf. note 1), 244. 
75  Kane, 4.48 (cf. note 1), 220. 
76  Kane, 4.48 (cf. note 1), 239. 
77  Gallagher, Shaun and Dan Zahavi, The Phenomenological Mind (London: Routledge, 2008), 213. 
78  Cf. e. g. Marco Caracciolo, “Those Insane Dream Sequences,” in Storyworlds across Media: To-
ward a Media-conscious Narratology, edit. Jan-Noel Thon and Marie-Laure Ryan (Lincoln: Uni-
versity of Nebraska Press, 2014), 153–165, here: 158. 
79  Kane, 4.48 (cf. note 1), 235. The list is taken from Henry A. Murray’s book Explorations in Per-
sonality (1938), which in turn is qtd. in Edwin S. Shneidman’s The Suicidal Mind (1996) — both 
used by Kane as materials in her play, cf. Diedrich, “Last in” (cf. note 16), 379–380. 
80  Kane, 4.48 (cf. note 1), 213. 
81  Kane, 4.48 (cf. note 1), 241. 
82  Kane, 4.48 (cf. note 1), 230. 
83  Kane, 4.48 (cf. note 1), 209. 
84  Kane, 4.48 (cf. note 1), 244. 
85  Ibid. (cf. note 1). 
86  Another paradox is that the actors are portraying someone who is disappearing, cf. Roberts, “Van-
ishing Acts” (cf. note 2), 96. 
87  Kane, 4.48 (cf. note 1), 245. 
88  Cf. Diedrich, “Last in” (cf. note 16), 391. 
89  Cf. Tycer, “Victim” (cf. note 6), 30. 
90  Cf. also Kane qtd. in Saunders, About Kane (cf. note 2), 79–80.  
